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In 2016, Kristy Herrick of Kent, Washington was shocked to learn that her local 10-acre
city park had been sold to a developer (Westneat, 2016a). Making matters worse, and despite
living next to the park, she had no idea it was even for sale. It turned out that even though Pine
Tree Park (PTP) had been for sale for two years, no one outside of the Kent city government or
the buyer could have realistically known about the sale. Furthermore, city workers did not post
the land-use development sign in the park until three months after the city council approved the
sale (Kent Parks and Recreation Commission [PRC], 2016c). The entire process of selling the
park to a housing developer had been in the works for more than ten years, and yet, no one
thought to ask the residents about it. You may be wondering, just as Herrick was, how the sale of
a public park could not only occur but also go unnoticed. And more importantly, why should
anyone living outside of Kent care about what seems to be a localized case of bad governance?
By critically examining the details of the PTP sale through Kent’s public documents and
local newspaper articles, I found that city leaders’ ideology surrounding economic vitality and
their technocratic-based decision making, combined with inadequate citizen participation, led to
the sale of PTP. Moreover, these issues are not unique to Kent but are part of a larger global
trend of democratic decline, which at one extreme leads toward autocracies (Lührmann et al.,
2018). This paper aims not only to show how the secret sale of one city’s park is a symptom of
larger issues of democracy but also to explore potential solutions which can strengthen
democracy.
There is no shortage of research surrounding the theory of a “global ‘democratic
recession’” (Wike, Simmons, Stokes, & Fetterolf, 2017; Mounk & Foa, 2018; Lührmann et al.,
2018). Inglehart (2018) proclaims, “the world is experiencing the most severe democratic
setback since the rise of fascism in the 1930s.” Mair (2006) is struck by the universality among
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36 advanced democracies of a trend in which people are participating less in politics and political
parties are less able to engage citizens (p. 33). The most recent annual Freedom in the World
report states that political rights and civil liberties worldwide have declined for the past 13 years
regardless of government type (Freedom House, 2019, p. 4). Even those who doubt the theory of
declining democracy, like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), believe current developments such as the
U.S. election of a president lacking democratic values could push democracy backwards globally
(pp. 204-206). Overall, these reports and theories paint a bleak picture of democracy at the
national level.
There are others, though, who suggest local level politics can reverse this trend while also
working toward solving other global issues (Levine, 2013; Green, 2013). According to Green
(2013), those who believe global issues can be solved locally, or glocalists, “say, we should stop
expecting big, centralized governments to solve the world's problems and start looking to cities
for innovative solutions.” This may not be a tenable approach for some large-scale problems,
such as global warming (Steinberg, 2015). As for democracy, though, Teune (1995) believes “If
democracy is to take root in the long run, then democratic political developments will have to
occur at the local level” (p. 23). With this in mind, one must first consider the aspects of local
government which indicate and support the theory of declining democracy before proposing
potential solutions. This paper does that by considering Kent’s PTP sale.
This paper begins with a brief explanation of how Kent’s PTP sale happened. This is
followed by an in-depth analysis of three main issues undermining democracy in Kent and their
connection to related global issues. The first issue involves the impact of economic interests on
democracy. The second considers technocratic decision-making and elected officials’ reliance on
technical experts. The third is a discussion of declining civic engagement. The final section
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provides potential solutions, as well as their feasibility for Kent. The goal is to not only show
that the issues of urban economic development ideologies, technocratic decision making, and
inadequate citizen participation are happening in Kent and in many cities and towns around the
world, but also that there are ways to create a more democratic future. The issues facing Kent are
universal obstacles to democratic local governance.
The city of Kent, Washington is a southern Seattle suburb of 128,000 residents located
within King County (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). Kent is the 10th most diverse city in the U.S.
with more than 130 languages spoken (McCann, 2019; Kent School District, 2018). The city
government consists of an elected mayor and seven council members elected at-large for four
year terms. There are no term limits (Kent Ordinance No. 3595).
In late 2005, ten years after annexing PTP from King County, the Kent city council voted
to sell the park (Kent Ordinance No. 3241, 1995; PRC, 2016c, p. 1). Finding the specific details
of the PTP sale in public records of the time is difficult. While the 2016 “Pine Tree Park
Timeline and After Action Review” (PRC, 2016c) is a valuable tool, it does not provide links to
specific documents nor accurately convey how inaccessible the mentions of this sale were to the
average citizen (see Appendix A for a detailed timeline). In fact, neighbors did not find out about
the sale until they happened to see a public notice sign posted in the park in December 2015,
three months after the council approved the sale and eleven years after the city started working
on the sale (PRC, 2016c).
The events show that Kent’s elected officials were less than transparent about selling
PTP. In fact, after the sale, they admitted, “The city had assumed that a public process to sell
PTP was unnecessary because the city had recently sold other parks and recreation property
without public processes and because PTP was undeveloped, not centrally located, and difficult

3

to access by vehicle”i (PRC, 2016c, p. 12). Zimmermann (2007) makes the argument that bad
public land management practices, like a “resistance to transparent procedures … directly
undermines the public’s trust in the ruling government and governance processes – a factor
essential for good governance” (p.32). So, why did elected officials “assume” it was acceptable
to sell a public park, even if it was out of the way, to a housing developer without consulting the
public?
The Role of Economic Interests in Cities
To answer that question, one can look at both Kent’s recent development history and at
the government/business relationship in any capitalist society. In both cases the answer is that
economic interests have a stronghold in local government mostly because city leaders believe in
the ideology of economic vitality. This is nothing new nor is it unique to Kent. In fact, according
to Lindblom (1977, p. 170), favoring business is prevalent in any private enterprise marketoriented society, i.e. most of the world. There is a pervasive idea that cities must grow and that
growth means adding businesses to attract more people to live in the city which then generates
more revenues for the city. In 1993, one Kent councilmember summed up this idea perfectly
when referring to Kent’s downtown economic vitality plan, "either you grow or you die. We're
just trying to figure out the best way to grow" (Wurzer & Leovy, 1993). There is also an aspect
of competition in this sentiment; if a city cannot attract business there is the belief that the
businesses will move to other cities that can offer them better incentives.
This economic vitality ideology means cities cater to business interests and this gives the
business community an advantage over citizens. Peters and Pierre (2012) argue, “As a key
societal player in most cities, the business sector has the capacity, through action or inaction, to
determine much of the outcome of the city's policies” (p. 8). Developers can decide where to
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build based on the best financial incentives. And “even though corporate leaders cannot simply
dictate to City Hall, business interests occupy a special place in the local arena” (Ross & Levine,
2012, p. 80) because city officials hold on to the ideology that they must be economically viable
above all else. This unspoken power, according to Lindblom (1977), means business leaders are
more than an interest group (p. 172). For him, business executives “appear as functionaries
performing functions that government officials regard as indispensable” (Lindblom, 1977, p.
175), giving business a “privileged role in government” (p. 172). Or as another political theorist
simply states, “economic power is political power” (Arblaster, 1987, p. 102).
This notion that growth is key has given Kent a history of putting development above
social and environmental concerns. To take one key example, part of Kent’s downtown
revitalization project of the 1990s included city leaders actively pursuing a regional justice center
being built in Kent, “hoping the center will be a business magnet, employing hundreds, filling
nearby offices and luring new restaurants into downtown Kent” (Leovy, 1992; “City makes the
first offer,” 1991). The 931 bed jail and court facility was built in Kent, as neighbors feared,
“next to the Kent Commons - the city's recreation center - and across the street from ball fields
where children play” (Leovy, 1992). In fact, there were two playfields next to the jail, Commons
Playfields and Borden Playfields. The Seattle Times even named Borden Playfields as one of
their “perfect places for summer picnics” (“South end parks,” 1995).
The city solved the problem of having children playing near the jail by eliminating the
fields. In 2005, the city sold Borden Playfields and its adjacent property to a developer. The land
south of the playfields was previously a chemical plant which “the city spent $16 million to buy
and clean up 20 acres” (Boyer, 2005). At the time, city leaders said they “expect their investment
to pay off from the enhanced tax base” (Boyer, 2005). Then, the Commons Playfields on the
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north side of the jail was also removed in 2007 to build a $84.5 million events arena (Hunter,
2008; Hunter, 2009). At the time, people were upset at the loss of land. In fact, in 2009, at a
public meeting, people were asking “when the city planned to replace the soccer fields lost with
the closure of the Commons Playfields two years ago to make room for the ShoWare Center”
(Hunter, 2009).
It was clear from these examples that the council’s main concern was the economic
vitality. In fact, this idea has persisted throughout mayoral and council member changes and
despite the public backlash. In 2017, one year after the PTP sale, the Kent City Council voted to
sell Kent’s public par-3 golf course to an apartment and retail developer (Hunter, 2017a). There
was brief talk from two councilmembers to try to preserve the grounds for a park, but the five
other councilmembers dismissed that idea. The council president said “he would have voted to
sell the property to a developer even if there had been a formal proposal to keep the land in its
natural habitat with possibly a couple of ball fields” (Hunter, 2017a). Furthermore, the Mayor
was concerned about the city’s relationship with developers, saying the sale, “would really
damage the city’s reputation with quality developers to in the last minute change course”
(Hunter, 2017a). Parks are clearly not a priority of the top officials in Kent.
Why is development so crucial to cities and why are they so willing to readily accept
developers’ plans? Because, elected officials are worried that that potential revenue could go to
competing cities (Kantor & Turok, 2012, p. 474). According to Kantor and Turok (2012), “The
city seeks to build a reputation for being business-friendly through its speedy decision-making
and undemanding requirements on issues such as the environment, social responsibility, and
contributions to infrastructure costs” (p. 478). This certainly happened in the golf course sale; the
council did not want to take the time to discuss possible alternatives (Hunter, 2017a). Not to
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mention the $16 million the city spent to clean up a hazardous waste site only to turn around to
sell it with hopes of recouping the money from “the enhanced tax base” (Boyer, 2005). Most
significantly, the city was willing to sell PTP to a housing developer and complete all the
necessary land zoning changes without openly requesting public input.
To be fair, Kent’s business community does not always have a stranglehold on
government policies. In 2017, the council increased the business square footage tax to help pay
for parks, and then in 2018, they increased B&O taxes, again, to help pay for parks (Hunter,
2017b, 2018)ii. The Mayor seemed to understand the necessity for a healthy balance of business
and social concerns, stating “without taking care of the community – providing public safety and
programs – we have no community for business to operate in” (Hunter, 2018). After the 2018
vote to increase B&O tax rates, the council president expressed to Kent’s Chamber of Commerce
a hope to “bridge the relationship to work on the same page and on the same team” (Hunter,
2018). It is clear that the council wanted to maintain their “good for business” standing, despite
the tax increases (Ross & Levine, 2012, p. 80).
Technocratic Decision-Making
Another issue beyond an economic development mindset is the reliance on experts for
scientific, rational solutions when making policy decisions. In its purest form, “technocracy …
refers to a system of governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their
specialized knowledge and position in dominant political and economic institutions” (Fischer,
1990, p. 17).iii This type of governance, Fischer (1990) explains, is not always obvious; it can
happen less recognizably behind the scenes when elected officials rely on administrators and
consultants for policy decisions (pp. 19-21).
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Some theorists believe this reliance on technical answers to policy decisions is
detrimental to democracy. Dickson and Noble (1981) argue that it is an “attack on democracy in
the name of ‘efficiency,’ ‘manageability,’ ‘governability,’ ‘rationality’ and ‘competence’ (p. 4).
Fischer (1990) agrees, stating that some believe things like political bargaining and
compromising are a “nightmare of irrationality” (p. 22). Technocrats feel there is a standard,
correct answer for governmental problems.
But social issues are complicated and there are not always technical solutions. People
value things like quality of life that cannot be measured with a cost-benefit analysis (Levine,
2013, pp. 64-70). Furthermore, Levine (2013) argues, the people who live and experience the
community have a better understanding of the issues that impact them. That said, Putnam’s
(2000) reviews of technocratic theory revealed that “the technocrat typically lacks sympathy for
popular participation in government and shows contempt for the average citizen” (p. 398).
Democratic endeavors, like dealing with the public’s perceptions and feelings, may seem
irrational. And deliberation may be considered too time-consuming, making government less
efficient; all of which go against traditional technical thinking that is pervasive in Western
culture (Fischer, 1990, pp. 59-60).
That said, certain situations may require expertise. In 2011, both Italy and Greece elected
financial experts to head their governments in hopes of fixing their respective economic crises
(“Who, What, Why,” 2011). Majone believed “experts were better able to deal with the technical
complexities of modern law-making, which often confused elected politicians” (as cited in Mair,
2006, p. 27). So, in some instances of complete economic failure and in legal issues which
require advanced knowledge of the law and economic policies, technocrats may be the best
people to sort out those complex problems.
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Experts are essential in those contexts, but in the affairs of a democratic local
government, determining policies that impact people’s daily lives, elected officials should not
rely solely on the experts’ opinions. Instead, experts should present information and analyze
various possible courses of action as objectively as possible. Levine (2013) argues the goal is not
to dismiss experts but to “recognize the value of genuine collaborations that involve experts” (p.
70). Schudson (2006) agrees that experts must be educated in democratic values and held
accountable because according to him, “a democracy without experts either will fail to get things
done or will fail to satisfy citizens” (pp. 504-505). It is not only experts who are divided on
technocratic rule. A 2017 Pew Research study of 38 nations shows that people are split on the
idea of having a government led by technocrats; 49% think it is a good idea, while 46% of those
surveyed believe it is a bad idea (Wike, Simmons, Stokes, & Fetterolf, 2017).
So how does this relate to Kent and the PTP sale? The problem with relying on experts is
that research, statistics, and facts often take the place of deliberating with citizens (Fischer, 1990,
p. 18). This is exactly what happened during the sale of PTP. Facing tough financial times, Kent
leaders had city staff create a list of properties to sell. Kent’s parks department staff, the city’s
experts on parks’ affairs, determined which properties could be sold. Throughout the process of
the sale, the council relied on upper-level parks employees to work out the finer details of the
land saleiv (PRC, 2016c). According to the city’s own timeline, from 2012-2015, the council
received only one update per year (PRC, 2016c). And at no point did the council ask the public
what they thought about selling the park.
There are several reasons that cause council members, Kent included, to depend on
experts. The first is that they lack resources. Kent council positions are part-time, not well-paid,
and most of the councilmembers have jobs elsewhere (Hunter, 2015; Kent City Council, n.d.-a).
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And unlike major cities, Kent’s councilmembers do not have staff members working for them.
Furthermore, the positions are non-partisan, meaning they lack the added support from political
parties. Ross and Levine (2012) argue that “amateur, part-time legislators are in a poor position
to challenge the reports and recommendations of the city manager, municipal department heads,
and professional consultants” (p. 112). Without a staff, councilmembers do not have time to
investigate claims made by the experts. They must trust whatever the professionals tell them.
This is why they allowed the parks employees and city’s attorneys to work out the details of this
salev.
It is clear that the council trusted the parks department staff and made “assumptions”
(PRC, 2016c, p. 12) based on their recommendations. The Kent city council members thought
they and their staff knew best and had no need to notify the public of park sales (PRC, 2016c, p.
12). The council saw the park as “undeveloped, not centrally located, and difficult to access by
vehicle” (PRC, 2016c, p. 12) and therefore, it made rational, reasonable sense to sell the park.
The council would learn, three months after the sale, and ten years after the beginning of the
surplus process, that the citizens of Kent did not rationalize the sale of a park in a cost-benefit
manner. Once long-time neighbors of the park found out about the sale, there was no shortage of
outrage and criticism from Kent residents. This situation could have possibly been prevented if
elected officials had relied less on city staff and had brought the public into the conversation.
Lack of Meaningful Civic Engagement
The third issue facing local government is a lack of civic engagement. Scholars use
different terminology like political engagement, citizen participation, and civic engagement to
describe the same principle−citizens influencing policy, often through deliberation (Ross &
Levine, 2012, p. 159; Arnstein, 2016; Levine, 2013, p. 15). Meaningful participation, for
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Arnstein (2016), means giving power to the powerless, allowing citizens to contribute and
influence policies that impact their lives (p. 282). This type of civic engagement, participatory
and deliberative, researchers believe, is especially beneficial for democracy (Arnstein, 2016;
Fung, 2007; Michels & Graaf, 2010; Levine, 2013; Putnam, 1995). Yet, many instances of civic
engagement opportunities do not result in an ideal democracy where all affected interests have an
equal say in the outcome (Goodin, 2007).
The problems with many government leaders’ attempts to increase participation,
according to Warren (2009), are that “most of the new experiments engage a relatively few
citizens. Many involve only self-selected stakeholders and activists, and so by-pass broader
public interests, or generate new forms of exclusion” (p. 3). Furthermore, what government
agencies consider citizen participation may not resemble nor achieve a more democratic process
(Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p. 637; Ross & Levine, 2012, p. 162). To illustrate this point,
Arnstein (2016) uses a ladder metaphor for levels of citizen participation. On the lowest rung are
“illusory forms of ‘participation’” (p. 284) that include placing people on “rubberstamp advisory
committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of ‘educating’ them or engineering their
support” (p. 284). As far as surveys and council meetings, Arnstein (2016) considers them “a
window-dressing ritual” (p. 286). Elected officials get to check off that they included the public
in their decision-making process. Higher on Arnstein’s (2016) ladder are the rare participation
methods that give citizens various levels of decision-making power (p. 289).
Even if the institutional design does provide ample opportunities for political
engagement, some citizens do not participate for several reasons (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p.
637). One factor is the logistics of public meetings. People may not be able to attend a weeknight
meeting due to work or family obligations. Others may not have sufficient transportation, speak
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the same language, or be familiar with the procedures of government meetings (Lowndes &
Wilson, 2001, p. 639). With that in mind, some cities, like Kent, live stream the meetings on
social media and cable television and post the videos, agendas, and meeting minutes on their
website. This is not an interactive means of engagement though. People who are not at the
meeting cannot speak during the public comment segment.
Another reason people do not participate has to do with their attitudes towards politics
and elected officials in general. According to Lowndes and Wilson (2001), many people feel the
council will not respond to their concerns (p. 638). Or they may have an embittered view of
politics and want nothing to do with it because they feel politicians are corrupt (Ekman & Amnå,
2012, p. 294). Those feelings can come from cultural cues or “unwritten customs and codes”
(Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2006, p. 546). Elected officials can explicitly state values of
inclusiveness and working together to solve problems, but if their actions show otherwise, their
words appear as platitudes, creating distrust.
Another theory of declining political participation relates to the larger issue of declining
social capital. Sander and Putnam (2010) define social capital as “social networks and the norms
of reciprocity and trust to which those networks give rise” (p. 9). Social organizations that foster
community and trust include religious, labor, and school groups, to name a few. Putnam (1995)
found that in a survey of 35 countries, “social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated;
the greater the density of associational membership in a society, the more trusting its citizens” (p.
73). Both Levine (2013) and Putnam (1995, 2000) agree that strong social capital is necessary
for a healthy democracy. Levine (2013) argues that before people “will seek government reforms
or participate effectively in the democracy they need to be enlisted and working together on
public problems” (p. 149).
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But Putnam (1995, 2000) and Levine (2013) paint a grim picture of civic engagement
opportunities in the U.S. Putnam (1995, 2000) explores how declining social memberships has
weakened social capital in the U.S. Over time, fewer people attend religious services or belong to
labor unions or parent-teacher organizations, and this negatively impacts democracy because
“members of associations are much more likely than nonmembers to participate in politics”
(Putnam, 1995, p. 73).
Kent officials proclaim they want to foster civic engagement. One of the city council’s
goals is “Embracing our diversity and advancing equity through genuine community
engagement” (Kent Biennial Budget 2019-2020 [KBB], 2018, p. 19). However, they do not
further define “genuine community engagement.” The current mayor is slightly clearer, “I
believe that community engagement is more than just listening. It means acknowledging what
was said and working together to get results” (City of Kent, 2019). The city’s webpage for
boards and commissions clears things up a bit; the city “strongly encourages participation by the
general public in local government. The Mayor and City Council believe the city is best served
when there is broad representation of Kent residents serving on its boards, commissions and task
forces” (City of Kent, n.d.-a). But looking further at the city’s nine commissions and boards
reveals all but one, the Civil Service Commission, are advisory (City of Kent, n.d.-a). In other
words, they make recommendations to the mayor and city council but do not have any
authoritative power to create or change policy or plans.
Kent staff and elected officials do conduct surveys, hold public meetings that allow for
public comment (although, the council does not have to respond and comments are limited to
three minutes per person), and have events where residents can chat with city leaders. The city
also has social media accounts to get information out, but those efforts are not meaningfully
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democratic (Arnstein, 2016). The mayor and police chief, as a manner of professional courtesy,
may listen to a citizen’s concerns but there is no guarantee or assurance that anything will come
of the conversation. In those situations, the city leaders have all the power.
To measure their goal of civic engagement, in 2018, the mayor used statistics for how
many people attended an informational budget meeting, the number of followers on Kent’s social
media accounts, and the number of public videos the city staff produced (KBB, 2018, p. 25). The
document states that these communications are not only informative but also “facilitate
engagement between the City, residents, businesses, local partners and elected officials (KBB,
2018, p. 25). However, having more opportunities to express opinions does not have the same
impact on citizens or elected officials as the empowerment of deliberative, participatory means
of engagement (Michels & De Graaf, 2010; Fung, 2007; Levine, 2013; Putnam, 1995; Warren,
2009).
As for as the sale of PTP, one could blame the residents of Kent for not showing up to
public meetings where staff brought up the sale, but, as mentioned earlier, there was no
reasonable way anyone could have known about this sale from meeting agendas. And the elected
officials, who say they value “genuine community engagement” (KBB, 2018, p. 19), failed to
mention the sale to the public. Furthermore, despite the lack of institutional support for real
participatory democratic endeavors, Kent residents upset about the PTP sale used every means
available to engage with government officials and the public (see Appendix B for detailed
information).
The council, on the other hand, admitted they made a mistake by not informing the
public. The council president said he was at first unaware of the lack of public notice and said,
“it was not anything on purpose” (Hunter, 2016a). He also argued, “There was nothing illegal or
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unethical about the sale of Pine Tree Park. … Our only error was not doing a better job engaging
with the park’s neighbors before making the tough decision to sell” (Westneat, 2016c). After
three months of negative publicity and feedback, the council decided to pause the sale while they
considered their options (Hunter, 2016a). The city council admitted their lack of public
engagement “placed the city in a very difficult position and clouded the rest of the process”
(PRC, 2016c, p. 13). And later that year, they adopted a policy for selling city-owned property
that included public notification measures like “at least one public meeting to receive public
comment; posted notice at the property; a public notice in the newspaper; and a mailing to
property owners near the site” (Hunter, 2016g).
From the public’s comments about the sale, it appears there was clearly a lack of
trust−the key component of social capital and civic engagement motivation−between residents
and the council. Multiple residents expressed their disapproval of the city and the sale using
words and phrases like “untrustworthy” (Hunter, 2016b), “needs to rebuild trust” (Cross, 2016),
“erosion of trust” (PRC, 2016a, p. 3), and “violated our trust” (Hunter, 2016a). The neighbors
and supporters of the park, on the other hand, seemed to possess a strong enough trust in each
other, despite not being a previously formalized social group, that they were able to unite in a
cause (Save Pine Tree Park, n.d.). In this way, Kent residents challenge Levine’s (2013) and
Putnam’s (1995) notion that people must first be engaged in social groups to impact policy. That
said, residents may have prevented the issue if they had spoken up earlier about their support of
parks and open spaces. Of course, they probably did not suspect that the city would sell a park
without telling the public. Park supporters were ultimately limited by the lack of civic
engagement prior to the sale. Levine (2013) says this is typical of government as “major
institutions are set up to ignore and even frustrate civic engagement” (p. 15).
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Solutions
So how can city governments address issues of declining civic engagement, technocraticdecision making, and the privileged position of business to increase democracy? Scholars agree
that solving these issues is a necessary, albeit difficult task (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, pp. 642643; Putnam, 2000, p. 402; Lindblom, 1977, pp. 344-356). One solution which counters all three
issues is increasing meaningful opportunities for civic participation. Yet, equalizing power
relative to business interests also requires additional strategies like regional governmental
restraints on business practices. Any efforts to change government institutions, people’s level of
political participation, and city leaders’ favoritism toward business will require larger cultural
shifts that are easier called for than implemented (Warren & Pearse, 2008, p. 3).
But there are cities and individuals around the world who have already started working
toward more participatory forms of government. Several optimistic scholars use numerous
examples of citizens taking an active role in local government decision-making processes to
counter the issues of expert control and business privilege (Clark & Teachout, 2012; Steinberg,
2015; Levine, 2013). Both Levine (2013) and Putnam (2000) agree that improving civic
education, strengthening existing social networks, like faith-based groups, and designing better
public spaces for socializing, what Klinenberg (2018) calls “social infrastructure,” are ways to
foster civic engagement. While those measures are likely necessary, giving people opportunities
to actively influence policy decisions, through institutional means, could most positively
influence political participation (Levine, 2013, p. 185; Lowndes & Wilson, 2001).
One often cited example of successful participatory, deliberative democratic reform is the
2004 British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (CA). The CA effectively
created the opportunity and ensured more people participated in a policy decision. The CA “was
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an independent, non-partisan assembly of 160 randomly selected British Columbians who looked
at how votes cast in provincial elections translate into seats in the Legislature” (Citizens’
Assembly [CA], 2003). The CA was fully supported by the legislature and “given the time,
power, support, and financing to return a credible, representative, and deliberative decision”
(Warren & Pearse, p. 7; CA, 2003). After one year of learning about electoral systems, getting
public feedback, and deliberating, the CA voted to change the electoral system and sent a
referendum to the voters (Warren & Pearse, 2008, pp. 11-12). Ultimately, however, voters
narrowly rejected the proposed changes in 2005 and then by a much wider margin in 2009
(Pilon, 2010).
Despite creating meaningful engagement by giving those involved the ability to construct
policy, the failures of the CA indicate this type of reform is difficult, especially when legislators
control the formation of the assembly and the rules that impact them, like requiring a
supermajority for referendums (Carty, Blais, & Fournier, 2008, p. 160; Pilon, 2010).
Nevertheless, the CA did give people a chance to participate, deliberate, and create potential
policy, and, “offers a new pathway to democratic reform” (Ferejohn, 2008, p. 213) which could
expand beyond electoral reform. And while the CA was ultimately unsuccessful in getting their
voting reform passed, the example, overall, was intriguing enough that other citizens’ assemblies
were created elsewhere (Carty, Blais, & Fournier, 2008, p. 159; Pilon, 2010, p. 74). Cities
interested in increasing meaningful engagement opportunities could apply the CA example when
determining other policies.
Another example of political reform that brings power to ordinary citizens is participatory
budgeting (PB). PB started in Brazil in 1989 to counter council corruption in awarding
development projects (Fung, 2007, p. 454). Since then, more than 1200 cities worldwide employ
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PB (Clark & Teachout, 2012, p. 171-172). While the details of PB vary by city, the underlying
principle is that residents, not elected officials, determine how to spend the city’s money (Clark
& Teachout, 2012, pp. 171-172; Levine, 2013, p. 121). Most often, this is done through initial
deliberation by districts and then a public vote (p. 172). The most important aspect is that the
“decisions by the citizens are binding” (Clark & Teachout, 2012, p. 172). PB not only increases
participation but also gives power to ordinary citizens to significantly influence the livability of
their neighborhood, and is therefore, an example of meaningful participatory democracy.
One of the most significant forms of meaningful participatory democracy is the New
England (NE) style town hall meetings. These meetings go beyond the typical city council
meeting where residents observe and give comment (Clark & Teachout, 2012, p. 178). Instead,
in many NE towns, voters gather to deliberate and determine policy (p. 178). Despite lacking
financial incentives and facing mundane city business topics, “town meetings still bring out
hundreds of participants, in hundreds of towns across New England, every single year” (p. 180).
Clark and Teachout (2012) argue this is because people value being able to make decisions and
without this power there would not be much incentive to participate (p. 182). Furthermore, there
are indications that this governance style leads to higher rates of social capital; “Vermont, where
the Town meeting tradition is among the strongest, usually ranks in the top three, and often first”
in U.S. measures of social capital (p. 180). NE townhalls successfully increase participation
while also giving expansive power to citizens. That said, town meetings may not work
everywhere. Clark and Teachout (2012) admit that “town meetings work better—dramatically
better—in small towns than in large towns”(p. 179), with small towns being defined as
“neighborhood-size” (p. 181).
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For this reason, many U.S. cities have turned to neighborhood councils to involve the
public in government processes (Gates, 2009). While neighborhood councils may increase
political participation, researchers have concerns about their inclusiveness and impact on social
capital (Dierwechter & Coffey, 2010, p. 485; Gates, 2009, p. 7; Michels & Graaf, 2010, p. 486).
The councils, without proper implementation and rules, can turn into “local fiefdoms”
(Dierwechter & Coffey, 2010, p. 486) in which people feel excluded. To be effective,
democratically speaking, the city government needs to give the councils decision-making power
and financial resources, foster a culture of supporting the councils, and ensure the councils are
widespread (Ross & Levine, 2012, p. 166; Gates, p. 7). The neighborhood councils do not have
the power to influence larger city-wide policies and so their participation in policy is limited to
their neighborhood. Furthermore, without a sustainable source of funds, the councils cannot
implement long-term policies that might significantly improve their quality of life. Without
allowing neighborhood councils representation in policy decisions, their political participation is
limited.
Other American cities are making strides in engaging citizens in different ways. Austin,
Texas is a diverse city with 800,000 residents (Clark & Teachout, 2012, pp. 125-126) that has
managed to create a culture of embracing community input. This is partly because city
department leaders have learned that the council “may derail projects that have not adequately
engaged citizens” (p. 125). Additionally, the city has a community engagement official who not
only works with residents and staff to create various engagement tools that cater to Austin’s
diverse population, but also ensures that city staff implement public input (pp. 125-126). While
many of Austin’s civic engagement programs fail to allow citizens to create policy, there is an
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assurance that the elected officials and city staff value and consider citizen feedback in policy
decisions.
So far, all these examples have been governance-driven, but Putnam (2000) and Levine
(2013) agree that institutional opportunities for participation are useless without individual and
collective action (p. 414; p. 164). With that in mind, there are grassroots efforts which
successfully get measures passed by increasing the number of people participating in political
issues. These mobilizations can be especially useful when opposing business interests. Changing
norms which may appear in conflict with economic development is not likely to happen easily,
so citizens must create an intentional strategy. Furthermore, these strategies are transferable to
other interest groups and can prompt larger movements (Levine, 2013, p. 188).
Part of that strategy includes determining the best way to get people involved and
ensuring adequate policy follow through. Rosenblum (2015) explores the coalition building
efforts of SeaTac airport workers pushing for a $15 minimum wage. This was especially difficult
because the business community, which included major airlines, had their own powerful
coalition centered on a common interest, while the cultural and ethnically diverse residents and
workers in SeaTac, where the voter initiative was being voted on, had to work toward finding
common groundvi (p. 14). For these reasons, workers had to appeal to larger cultural issues
beyond raising the minimum wage. Instead, they framed their cause as a “community campaign
to build worker power” (p. 14). With this broad message and the financial and leadership support
of the workers’ unions, their efforts were ultimately successful and afterward, the coalition
continued to pursue labor rights for other airport workers (p. 16).
Luce (2005), who studied living wage movements in the U.S., found that because living
wage laws seem bad for business, cities are reluctant to enforce the measures (p. 86). Because of
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this, the most successful living wage supporters had a long-term strategy that included not only
passing the increased wage law but also incorporated implementation monitoring and
enforcement. What Luce (2005) calls an inside/outside approac consists of having supporters
outside the government, including those impacted by the ordinance, form coalitions and
participate in activists’ measures like protesting and monitoring the implementation of the law.
The inside strategy ensures that the government has taken the necessary steps to enforce the law.
Coalition members could even have a formal role in the implementation process (p. 86). The
lesson for civic engagement is when pushing for policy change, especially if it counters a strong
interest group like business, there must be a commitment and consideration of the long-term
implementation enforcement.
Despite the successes of minimum wage coalitions in the U.S., there may be instances
when the local government needs to implement external government controls on business to
ensure all voices are being considered in policy decisions. Furthermore, local policies regarding
business must be part of a region-wide scheme, otherwise, businesses can simply move to a
neighboring city. These intergovernmental collaborations are part of the New Regionalism
movement which Ross and Levine (2012) argue can also help cities gain more business (p. 258).
It is clear from the models above that any successful strategy to increase civic
participation, to overcome technocracy and business interests, must be multifaceted and speak to
larger cultural issues which impact a broad population. For example, in Kent, leaders must
determine why people are upset about the council’s seeming favoritism toward business. It is
likely that the council’s desire for development seems more important than quality of life
concerns. To incorporate those views, the council will need to create opportunities for
meaningful engagement which give power to residents. Additionally, the people of Kent will
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have to push the council to provide these opportunities. Arnstein (2016) explains, “In most cases
where power has come to be shared it was taken by the citizens, not given by the city” (p. 289).
For Kent, this means their diverse community that consists of immigrants, refugees, and noncitizens and speaks more than 100 languages, will have to work together to build a coalition
based on a broad agenda and focused on the long-term implementation of any policy, like the
living wage cases in SeaTac.
As for the institutional civic engagement avenues which already exist in Kent, the city
does have neighborhood councils, but they are voluntary and not every neighborhood has a
council. Registered councils can “apply for a Matching Grants for neighborhood improvement
projects” and get city provided publicity, training, and organizing support (City of Kent, n.d.-c).
As described previously, this is not the ideal form of neighborhood councils. For these councils
to be more democratic, they would need to incorporate all neighborhoods, provide universal
funding, and allow members a seat at the policy-making table (Ross & Levine, 2012, p. 166;
Gates, 2009, p. 7).
As far as more broad delegations of power like the CA, PB, and NE town halls, these
efforts would likely take a lot of time and staff resources. Getting random citizens to participate
in a year-long, CA type venture may prove challenging. The city would need to consider paying
the participants, similar to U.S. juries, to encourage participation. Furthermore, “while
deliberative approaches may be most likely to foster social capital, they may be inappropriate
(for example) where local agencies are seeking quick responses from busy people, or where
policy choices are tightly constrained by legislation or resource availability” (Lowndes &
Wilson, 2001, p. 636). There may be certain policies, like redevelopment, that attract more
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interest from residents than others (Adams, 2007, pp. 46-48). The Kent city council should focus
their civic engagement on those areas first.
Due to financial constraints, lack of council resources, and the size and diversity of
Kent’s population, Kent’s solutions for declining democracy may need to resemble those of
Austin, which employs a variety of methods for engagement, has dedicated staff to monitor
engagement and creates a positive civic engagement culture. Moreover, having a city community
engagement staff member ensures a consistent commitment to engagement. Without this link
between elected officials and the public, it is all too easy for elected official to blame issues on
previous regimes.
To counter business interests, Kent leaders will, no doubt, have to work with regional
partners, ensuring they have uniform policies to prevent businesses from favoring neighboring
cities. To avoid backlash from residents though, Kent officials should also incorporate citizens
into economic development planning. Residents can give more generalized opinions that include
quality of life factors city experts may not consider during project planning.
While it could be argued that Kent residents may not embrace civic engagement
opportunities, Dahl (1990) argues that is no reason not to try. He states, “if we were to abolish
democracy wherever substantial segments of the population failed to use their opportunities to
participate, there might not be much in the way of rule by the people of standing anywhere in the
world” (p. 130). Kent’s officials should consider democratization efforts even if the impact
seems insignificant to them. These measures would also help the city council reach their goal of
“Embracing our diversity and advancing equity through genuine community engagement” (City
of Kent, n.d.-b).
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Citizens, too, will need to manage their expectations. Michels and Graaf (2010) found
that “most citizens take part in participatory policy making projects with enthusiasm, buoyed by
the feeling that they can contribute to improvement in their neighbourhood” (p. 489) but that
enthusiasm diminishes as they learn they may not have as much power to change things as they
thought they did. For this reason, Michels and Graaf (2010) argue, governments will need to set
clear guidelines for citizens (p. 489). Moreover, citizens will need to understand that grassroots
organizing is not an easy one-time task. Instead, it requires a lasting dedication to the cause
(Luce, 2005).
Conclusion
My research not only shows that there is room for improving democratic efforts in Kent’s
government but also provides solutions that can create a meaningful participatory democracy.
Obviously not all solutions are equally viable, as each city has unique circumstances, but that
does not mean there are not pieces that can be adapted and successfully implemented to create
more opportunities for political engagement. As stated earlier though, for any proposed solution
to work, there must be a cultural shift. The public needs to see the benefits of participation and
believe they can make a difference.
For Kent residents, they need look no further than the PTP sale. Through grassroots
citizen engagement, lobbying, and threats of a lawsuit, residents convinced the council to back
out of the sale (Hunter, 2016e). After an $800,000 taxpayer-funded settlement with the housing
developer and real-estate broker, the people of Kent got their park back (Hunter, 2016f). While
the council learned a valuable lesson about the importance of notifying the public of public land
sales beforehand, they failed to enact more meaningful civic engagement practices that extend
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beyond land sales. The solutions I proposed could benefit city leaders and residents while also
preventing another costly Pine Tree Park-type incident.
Examining Kent’s PTP sale revealed the democratic challenges city level governments
face and it shed light on how those challenges are not unique to Kent. Leaving people out of
governing causes a reliance on experts and allows businesses to maintain their privileged
position in government. This is not democratic rule by the public. If we are to thrive in a world
of unprecedented challenges created by climate change and globalization, ordinary people are
going to have to demand political decision-making power to overcome powerful, wealthy
government and business interests.
The demand for participatory democracy must be universal and not limited to Kent or
other U.S. cities. Declining democracy, especially as a result of a reliance on experts, failure to
engage the public, and allowing business interests to dictate policies, impacts all people. Policy
effects no longer have boundaries. Pollution, fires, animal extinctions, and workers’ rights do not
stop at state lines. It is all too easy for businesses to take their unfair labor practices and pollution
elsewhere. Governments and the people must recognize this stark reality and understand that the
policies of our local communities impact the larger society.
It takes only a few dedicated individuals to start a movement. What we need now is not
only technical, scientific, and political experts but also people proficient in caring about others
and willing to do the challenging work of ensuring all people have a say in their government. We
are the experts of our own needs, wants, and desires. Let us determine the future for ourselves.
Let us create the example that others can follow of a more democratic local government. Let us
start the democratic revolution that reverses the trend of declining democracy.
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Appendix A
Pine Tree Park Timeline
In 1968, King County voters approved a land preservation bond and with some of that money the
county bought a 10-acre parcel for PTP (Westneat, 2016a). By 1996 the city of Kent had grown
and annexed that section of King County (Kent Ordinance No. 3241, 1995). This annexation
required an amendment to the city’s comprehensive plan, in which the council designated PTP as
open space (Kent Ordinance No. 3261, 1996). For the next ten years, Pine Tree Park maintained
its status as a park.
Right from the beginning, the sale lacked transparency. Selling PTP was not listed on the
agenda for the December 13th, 2005 council meeting, but rather added during the meeting (Kent
City Council, 2005a; Kent City Council , 2005b).The minutes state the parks director said,
“funds from the surplus would be used to build two new parks” (p. 6). For another nine years,
there was no public mention of this sale; All business occurred through email or in closed
executive session (PRC, 2016c).
At the end of October 2014, city staff listed Pine Tree Park for sale at $2.2 million and,
shortly thereafter, a housing developer offered full price for the park (PRC, 2016c, p. 7). This
sale required changing the zoning of the park to allow for a housing development. And so,
finally, on January 12, 2015, the sale was briefly mentioned at an Economic & Community
Development (ECDC) Committee meeting, but it was not specifically mentioned on the posted
agenda. One must read to page 49 of the agenda notes to see it mentioned, kind of; PTP is listed
in a table under the category “City property acquisition, sale or development” (Kent ECDC,
2015a). That could mean anything from selling to improving the park. In July 2015, the park, by
its name, was mentioned in an ECDC meeting and the minutes (Kent ECDC, 2015b, p. 4). The
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next month the ECDC voted to send the ordinance to the full council (Kent ECDC, 2015c,
August, pp. 4-5). It was then mentioned in a council meeting agenda packet in September 2015
on page 587 on a map which says, “Park & Open Space to Single Family (SF-4.5)” (Kent City
Council, 2015a). At, the same time, in the same agenda packet, “included as a separate ordinance
for the same overall comprehensive plan agenda item is the updated 2015 Comprehensive Plan
wherein PTP is on the map of parks and recreation facilities in the Parks and Recreation Element
(as it has been for many years)” (PRC, 2016c, p. 10). The council adopted both the
comprehensive and the contradictory land use plan.
City staff did everything like appraising the land and posting the property for sale behind
the scenes. There was a lot of negotiating with the county and other agencies that got done
through phone calls and emails to make this sale happen. Complicating the matter was the King
County Ordinance signed in 1996 which stated, “The city covenants to operate and maintain the
site in perpetuity as a public open space … except that the City may trade the site or part of the
site for property of equal or greater parks and recreational value” (King County Ordinance No.
12157). City staff had to ensure the sale was viable. After getting a full-price offer, the city
council voted and unanimously approved the sale (PRC, 2016c, p. 10).
This vote came during the September 15, 2015 city council meeting, but was not
specifically listed on the agenda and happened after an executive session (Kent City Council,
2015b). The agenda was labeled: “EXECUTIVE SESSION AND ACTION AFTER
EXECUTIVE SESSION A. Property Negotiations, as per RCW 42.30.110(1)(c)” (Kent City
Council, 2015b, p. 4). So, there was an open meeting, council went into an extended executive
session, came back at 8:52 PM, and voted to approve the sale (Kent City Council, 2015c, pp. 67). The vote was listed in the agenda packet for the next regular council meeting three weeks
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later (Kent City Council, 2015d, pp. 26-27). The Pine Tree residents did not find out about the
sale until they happened to see a public notice sign posted in the park in December 2015, three
months after the sale and eleven years after the city started working on the sale (PRC, 2016c).
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Appendix B
Citizen Response to the PTP Sale
People opposing Kent’s PTP sale used various tactics to keep the city from finalizing the sale
with the housing developer. They spoke to reporters and wrote newspaper editorials from
January through April 2016 (Brantner, 2016; Cross, 2016; Gill, 2016; Honeycutt, 2016; Hunter,
2016a; Marachario, 2016; Westneat, 2016b). People spoke at city council and parks and
recreation commission meetingsvii (Kent City Council, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e,
2016f; PRC, 2016a, 2016b). The comments and editorials showed people were equally frustrated
with losing the park to a housing developer and the lack of public notice.
A group of residents also organized online resources for people hoping to save the park.
They started an online petition, which 309 people signed, urging the council and mayor to
reverse the sale of the park (Hunter, 2016c; Save Pine Tree, 2016). They also set up an
informational website and an online fundraising effort to help pay for an attorney to represent the
group (Herrick, 2016). They were able to meet their goal of $3,500. One resident also put up
signs in and near the park, informing the community about the “Save Pine Tree Park” website
and an upcoming PTP meeting. One reporter stated in March 2016 that “Residents have
hammered the council with public comment at each council meeting the last two months, emails
to the council and Kent Reporter letters to the editor asking the board to keep the park” (Hunter,
2016d). Political engagement on the part of citizens was not lacking when it came to the PTP
sale.

i

It should be noted that these other properties were not designated parks.
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ii

The parks department has been severely underfunded for years and is facing a $60 million

backlog (Hunter, 2017, May 12).

iii

Fischer (1990) gives an extensive history of the rise of technical expertise in politics in her

book Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise.
iv

Due to the laws surrounding the covenants of the park, made during the transfer from King

County to Kent in 1996, selling the land required clarification from King County. Obtaining
these clarifications was left to city staff. For example, in 2012, parks staff asked for legal advice
on whether “the City could sell it [PTP], or if the City literally had to ‘trade’ the property for
another property (PRC, 2016, p. 2). A city attorney found the deed “somewhat ambiguous” (p.
2), so a few months later, Kent staff members began consulting with the county about the legality
of the sale (p. 3). The council could have read the deed themselves, which clearly states, “The
City covenants to operate and maintain the site in perpetuity as a public open space … except
that the City may trade the site … for property of equal or greater parks and recreational value”
(King County Ordinance No. 12157, 1996). And they could have done their own consulting with
the county, but instead, they entrusted the experienced parks administrators. Their reliance on
experts turned out to be misguided. Several months after the council approved selling PTP, with
the belief that they could upgrade another park, the county attorney notified Kent that they must
use the proceeds to buy additional park property (PRC, 2016c, p. 11). That scenario defeated the
purpose of selling the park.

v

This is also why councilmembers believed the parks employee when he told them that the

county said it was acceptable for Kent to sell PTP with the intent of reinvesting in an existing
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nearby park, instead of buying replacement park land. The council’s reliance on city staff led to a
significant misunderstanding between the county and the city.

vi

According to Rosenblum (2015), many of the workers at the airport were immigrants and

refugees with various religions and ethnicities, while “62 percent of the registered voters were
white, and overall more conservative than the airport workers and their allies” (p. 14).
vii

Kent’s Parks and Recreation Commission was formed in late 2014 and had its first meeting in

January of 2015. At the February 2016 PRC meeting, the parks director stated that because the
PTP sale was already in motion, he did not bring it up at any previous commission meetings. He
said that “when council has already commissioned staff to proceed with a directive, it’s not
brought to staff or an advisory group to ask for an opinion” (PRC, 2016a, p. 3). For that reason,
the commission played no role in the decision to sell the park. After the sale was made public,
the commission discussed the sale, listened to public comment, and some members attended
other public meetings about the sale (PRC, 2016a, 2016b).
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